This paper studies a telecommunications company's optimal network investment strategies. The objective of the company is to maximize the value of the network. According to our numerical examples we are not able to consider a single point-to-point connection separately from the network, because the network demands and capacities affect each other. Therefore, the whole network structure has to be considered in the point-to-point investments.
Introduction
Deregulation and technological developments have increased the supply of bandwidth.
Forrester Research, for instance, has estimated that network capacity in 2004 will be about 100 times the network capacity of year 1998 [see Ryan (2000) ]. Therefore, in some geographical areas there is a significant oversupply of capacity and capacity prices are declining. According to Ryan (2000) in these geographical areas 60% annual price erosion is the current and anticipated norm. However, the ratio between demand and supply is changing all the time, so the capacity prices are highly volatile, according to Cass (2000) they change by 20-40% annually [see also Mayfield (2000) ].
As the capacity prices decrease, the margins of telecom companies are becoming thinner.
New investments in networks require huge amount of capital to which companies have currently a limited access. Because of the limited capital, it is essential to take into account all available information when making investments or restructuring strategies. All decisions should be based on the maximization of the company's value and, e.g., the optimal investment timing should be analyzed by using this objective. The real option approach can make a significant contribution to many valuation and timing problems. The investment under uncertainty by using real option theory is summarized in Dixit and Pindyk (1994) and Trigeorgis (1996) . For the real option applications in telecommunications see, e.g., Alleman and Noam (1999) . The basic net present value (NPV) rule that neglects the value of waiting is sometimes misleading. With the NPV rule some investments are done earlier than optimal and, on the other hand, some investments are abandoned although they should be carried out [see, for example, Park and Herath (2000) ]. The difference between the NPV and real option approaches is significant in the situations where the level of uncertainty is high, which is the case in the telecommunications market [see Cass (2000) ].
Therefore, in this paper we solve the optimal investment timing by using the real option theory. In our telecommunications network we have several point-to-point investment opportunities that affect on each other. That is, in this paper we consider a sequential decision-making problem. Sequential stochastic optimization is studied, for instance, in Cairoli and Dalang (1996) . Our telecommunications capacity allocation problem can be viewed also as a portfolio selection problem. For the overview on the methods of portfolio theory see, e.g., Korn (1997) .
The purpose of this paper is to consider optimal network investment strategies under network effects. The network effects are due to the optimal capacity usage and in bandwidth market these effects can be seen as network arbitrage condition, also called geographical arbitrage condition [see e.g. Crametz (1999, 2000) ]. The pricing of bandwidth instruments and network effects are considered e.g. in Keppo (2001) . That paper starts modeling fixed routing point-to-point capacity prices and then the effects of network structure, i.e., the routing possibilities are modeled as exchange options. These network routing possibilities lower the point-to-point capacity market prices because each time the bandwidth seller can choose the cheapest path between the points. In the present paper we model the market prices and the investment effects by using blocking probabilities. Blocking probabilities under network effects are analyzed, e.g., in Kelly (1986 Kelly ( , 1996 , Luczak and Upfal (1999) , and Gune and Keppo (2002) . A capacity investment affects the single pointto-point connection's capacity level and due to the network structure this capacity change influences all network prices. Therefore, we have to consider the network structure in the timing of investments and our model implies that the investor under consideration is a kind of large agent whose investment decisions affect the capacity prices. Large agents' investment decisions are studied e.g. in del Sol and Ghemawat (1999) , Smit and Ankum (1993) , and Murto and Keppo (2002) . In contracts to these papers, the present paper considers only one agent but several investment opportunities that have to be optimized simultaneously.
Many papers have considered pricing and capacity usage with communication networks. Songhurst and Kelly (1997) consider the issues of network interaction that are inherent in appropriate usage-sensitive charging schemes. The stability and fairness of rate control algorithms for communication networks are studied in Kelly, Maulloo, and Tan (1998) . Courcoubetis, Kelly, Siris, and Weber (1998) analyze multi-service networks and charging schemes. These papers solve the capacity price endogenously as a result of a utility maximization problem.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 defines the framework used in the paper. Section 3 derives the optimal strategies of a single network company. Section 4 illustrates the model with numerical examples and Section 5 concludes.
Model
We explore an economy where telecommunications capacities are bought and sold continuously within an infinite time horizon. However, in Section 4 we will illustrate our optimization framework with finite time horizon's numerical examples. Throughout our model, we analyze a simple network of three nodes {1,2,3}. However, the model is not constrained to a three-node network, and the extension to the entire network is rather straightforward [see e.g. Arte and Keppo (2002) ]. The network structure and the corresponding capacity demands are illustrated in Figure 1 . We assume that at each time we know the point-to-point capacities and demands and, therefore, we can model the demand processes. The demands of Figure 1 are independent of
routings, i.e., they are capacity demands between the start and end points. We assume that the corresponding capacity prices are given by the service indicators as follows. 
service on the 'th connection at time 1 -blocking of the 'th connection at time
Assumption 2.1 implies that there exists a unique price for perfect quality capacity and for simplicity this price is independent of the point-to-point connection. A lower quality price can be calculated by using (2.1) because in this case the indicator is not always equal to one. In the present paper we are not interested in the pricing of perfect quality capacity
and instead of that we analyze the network investment opportunities and their effects on the service indicators. That is, we assume that the perfect quality price a is constant and where m is the number of alternative routings and in case m = 1 we get Assumption 2.1.
In describing the probabilistic structure of the economy, we refer to an underlying probability space ( , , ) F P Ω , along with the standard filtration { }
Here Ω is a set, F is a σ-algebra of subsets of Ω generated by a three dimensional Brownian motion ( )
, and P is a probability measure on F. Brownian motion B i refers to the uncertainties in the i'th connection's demand process. The following assumption gives the stochastic demand processes. 
ASSUMPTION 2.2 The process of the i'th demand ( ) i D t is given by the following Itô
The boundedness of the parameters guarantees the existence and uniqueness of the solution to (2.2).
Because we consider the network of Figure 1 , all the point-to-point demands affect all the network investments even if the demand processes were independent. This is illustrated in our numerical examples in Section 4. Similar results are derived in Gune and Keppo (2002) where the optimal routing and blocking probabilities are calculated under same network structure. For instance, according to that paper if the network capacities are known then the i'th connection's probability of getting the service at time T is given as follows
for all 0, 1,2, 3 , 1,2, 3 , 1,2, 3 , ,
area under a standard trivariate normal distribution function covering the region from -∞ to
We consider a firm that is defined by point-to-point capacity investment opportunities.
We make the following assumption on these opportunities. 
T k is a stopping time with respect to the filtration { }
According to Assumption 2.3 the investment times are increasing in the sense of i)-iii). At an investment time the company has to select a point-to-point connection of which capacity will be increased by c units. However, two or more investment times may have the same value and, therefore, there can be multiple point-to-point investments at the same time.
Optimal Network Investments
In this section we solve a telecommunications company's optimal network investment policy and we use similar representation as, e.g., in Korn (1998) and Peura and Keppo (2002) . Note that we consider the simple network of Figure 1 but our model can be extended to more complex situations. However, then the calculation of the Y-prices is more complicated as described in the previous section.
The objective is to maximize the value of the network. We consider the investor's total network cash flows because an investment decision can affect the cash flows of ongoing investments and, therefore, they have to be included in the analysis. The value of this network is given as follows
where the initial time T 0 = 0, δ ∈ R + is the investment sunk cost, the discount rate r ∈ R + , the investments increase the capacities by c units and, therefore, the capacity process
is an increasing function of C and the company is only able to increase the capacities, not decrease. The first term inside the expectation is the discounted cash flows from capacity selling between investment times T k-1
and T k . The second term is the discounted investment sunk cost from investment at time T k .
From (3.1) we get that the value function is defined by
where Π is the set of admissible strategies that satisfy Assumption 2.3 and for all π ∈ Π equation (3.1) holds.
The task is to identify ( , ) V D C and, if one exists, an admissible policy π * such that
The model is time-homogenous, in which case the demand and capacity levels are sufficient as state variables. We will characterize the value function ( , ) V D C through a set of inequalities and, therefore, we define the following auxiliary operators.
Let Θ be the set of real-valued functions on 6 + R . We define the operator M:Θ → Θ by
Thus, if we assume that the value function of the problem is f and the demand and capacity are ( ) , D C then ( ) , Mf D C describes the value under the best capital investment. Note that if we had more complex network structure then in (3.3) we would have maximum over all possible point-to-point investment opportunities.
We define the infinitesimal generator A associated with the demand processes of Assumption 2.2 by 
The first equation holds because D = 0 is an absorbing state in our model (demand equal to zero). The first inequality implies that the value with a new investment can never exceed the value function by the definition of the value function. The second inequality holds since waiting is always an admissible policy. The last equality states that in the optimum one of the inequalities must be tight, i.e., the company waits or carries out a capacity investment.
Let f be a continuous solution to (3.5). Then an admissible control policy π * can be constructed recursively as follows is not unique we select the smallest one as the optimal point-to-point investment at time k T * . That is, the optimal point-to-point connection does not have to be unique. This is illustrated in our numerical examples.
According to the first equation of (3.6) if Mf and f coincide the company makes a new capacity investment. The second equation selects the investment point-to-point and, therefore, the corresponding capacity of the i'th connection is given by
The next proposition proves the converse to Proposition 3.1, verifying that the set of inequalities (3.6) are sufficient conditions for the value function in our problem.
PROPOSITION 3.2 Let f be a solution to (3.5) which satisfies Ito's formula and for all admissible policies we have
We denote π * as the admissible policy constructed from f according to (3.6). Then
PROOF. See appendix.
Proposition 3.2 implies that we can solve the optimal strategy by using equation (3.6).
However, note that since the problem is multidimensional we are not able to solve the value function analytically. In the next section we illustrate the investment optimization with numerical examples.
Example
In this section we illustrate our model with hypothetical examples on a finite time horizon. We solve the investment problem with a simplified binomial model [for binomial models see, e.g., Seydel (2002) ]. In each time period the i'th demand may go upward with probability p ui or downward with probability p di (p di = 1 -p ui ) for all i ∈ {1,2,3}. That is, we model the demand processes of Assumption 2.2 with binomial trees. This is a usual approach, e.g., in American option pricing. For simplicity, all the demand processes are independent. Further, we assume that there are three time periods and investments can be done only during the two first periods. Thus, we use the three-period binomial tree in the modeling of the demand processes and the last time interval is used to calculate the investment values at the end of the second period. Since we have three point-to-point connections in our system, each first period's state ( )
is followed by eight possible states ( )
in the second time period. Therefore, there are 72 investment states that have to be optimized. The optimal investment strategy is solved by using equation (3.6) backward in the tree, i.e., by using dynamic programming. This First we assume that the one period upward and downward probabilities are the same for all the point-to-point connections as illustrated in the following table. Table 2 illustrates the optimal strategy. In each row the first cell indicates the change of the three demands in the first time period. For instance, (u,d,u) means the first and third point-to-point connection demands went upward while the second demand went downward.
The second cell shows the optimal strategy in the first period. The number indicates the optimal investment point-to-point and number 0 means no new investment. The next eight elements of each row are the optimal strategies in the second period following the stage shown in the first cell. Table 2 indicates that during the first period it is optimal to invest in the first point-topoint connections in three states, the second point-to-point connection in one state, and there are no investments in the third point-to-point connection. Note that according to (3.6) if there are several optimal investments then the investment with the smallest pointto-point number is selected and, therefore, the first point-to-point connection is selected in most of the cases. In the second period 6.25% of the states are such that we invest in the first connection, 17.19% such that we invest in the second connection, and 14.06% in the third connection. The high percentage for the second and third point-to-point investments is due to the fact that in many first period's states we already invested in the first connection and, therefore, during the second period new capacity is more needed in other connections.
In Table 2 there are many network effects. For instance, in the second line we firstly invest in the first point-to-point connection. Then in the second period we invest in the second point-to-point connection in states (u,u,u) , (u,u,d), and (d,u,u) . Note the second demand increases in all these cases. However, we do not invest if we have (d,u,d) even though the second goes up in this case. This is due to the network effects in the service indicator and the capacity price of Assumption 2.1. Thus, in the network investment analysis we are not able to consider a single point-to-point connection separately from the network, because the network demands and capacities affect each other.
Next we assume that the upward probability of the second point-to-point connection is greater than the downward probability. Thus, the second demand is expected to increase.
The binomial probabilities of our second case are in Table 3 . The second case's optimal investment strategy is given in the following table. 
As expected, comparing tables 2 and 4 due to the second demand process we are investing a little more and there are more second point-to-point investments. During the second period we invest mostly in the first connection (15.6% of the states) and this is because in the first period we mostly invest in the second connection. In 12.5% of the second period's states we invest in the second connection, and in 9.4% of the states we invest in the third connection.
There are again many network effects in Table 4 . For instance, in the third row of Table 4 we invest in the first connection in states (u,u,u), (u,u,d), and (u,d,u) , but not in (u,d,d) even though the first connection increases also in this case.
Finally we assume that also the third point-to-point connection's upward probability is greater than the downward probability. The binomial probabilities of our third case are given in Table 5 . The corresponding optimal investment strategy is given in Table 6 . 
Because of the high expected second and third demands we are only investing in those during the first period. Then in second period we are almost only investing in the first connection (21.9% of the states) and only in three states we invest in the second or third connections. Again, as expected, there are network effects in Table 6 .
Conclusion
In this paper we have derived a new network investment model by considering the network structure. The objective of the telecommunications company was to maximize the value of the network. By using a sequential real option model we characterized the optimal investment strategy. Then we illustrated our framework with numerical examples that were solved by using binomial trees. According to the examples, the network structure affects significantly the optimal strategies.
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 3.2.
Assume that equation (3.6) gives policy
and that Proposition 3.1 gives f.
Because according to (3.6) ( ) ( )
and according (3.5) one of the inequalities is tight, we have
where according to Assumption 2.3 1 0 T * ≥ . Now from (A.1) we get by using Assumption 2.2 and equation (3.4) 
( ) 
